Why the Euro Doesn't Work

Currently there are two existential problems in the euro area. The first is a relatively recent development and must be dealt with immediately, while the second has been building for about a decade and requires longer-term solutions:

1. The positive feedback loop between insolvency in the European periphery and stresses in the European banking sector.
2. The long-term structural divide between unit labour costs in the north and the south of Europe.

Let’s start at the beginning – ironically the second problem above. Before anyone gets pedantic, I realize that what follows quite a stylized story (ie short on details) but I am simplifying for the sake of clarity.

Before the nations now known rather pejoratively as the European periphery joined the euro area, their workers were kept competitive with those industrious Germans through a regime of flexible exchange rates. For example, if the Portuguese were not innovating as quickly as the Germans, the Portuguese escudo would depreciate against the German mark, making Portuguese products relatively cheaper (all else equal) and thereby allowing the Portuguese to compete with the Germans in international trade.

When the euro was introduced, this mechanism disappeared and the European periphery rapidly lost competitiveness with the core.

Seems like a raw deal right? Well not entirely. The upside for these chronically uncompetitive countries was that, despite all of structural differences between the economies, the bond markets began treating debt issued by any European government as essentially the same credit (assuming an implicit mutual guarantee). This allowed these countries to fill the gap created by the erosion of their domestic private sector with government spending financed by cheap debt issuance.

This was all good until it wasn't. Once people woke up to state of the sovereign finances in these countries (initially just Greece), they rushed for the exits. With European policymakers refusing to take bold action to resolve the crisis, it spread and evolved to the point where we stand now - uncomfortably close to the abyss.

The next post will describe in more detail why policy fixes introduced have been insufficient, and detail the policy prescription necessary for Europe to extricate themselves from the mess they have found themselves in.

Note: I have not included Ireland in this discussion because I consider both its path to fiscal ruin and the steps to recovery be considerably different from the nations detailed above.

Bad Asset Allocation (BAA) I

I have been critical of the valuations attached to the .com 2.0 firms since Groupon turned down $6 billion from Google. I said it then, and I’ll say it again Groupon/Google will prove to be the next Yahoo/Microsoft.

 Let’s have a look at the biggest name to IPO before markets crashed in August.

This clearly isn’t pets.com (there are real earnings there) but I can’t countenance that P/E. They’re priced for better than perfection.

I’ve heard all of the bull cases:

• They’re going to grow exponentially forever! 
• Investors are willing to pay a premium for high-growth companies in low-growth environments!
• They are revolutionizing the head-hunting industry!
• Think of all the advertising dollars they can rake in!

Sorry, not interested. Not at that valuation. If you’re willing to consider though, I have a bridge to sell you.

The Future of the Renminbi

If there has been one sure bet in financial markets over the last few years, it has been on an appreciation of the Chinese renminbi against the U.S. dollar.

The appreciation has been slow but steady. After a few years of managed appreciation, the renminbi was repegged during the 2008 crisis. In response to considerable pressure from the United States, the peg was removed  and the currency was re-'floated' in June 2010. However, the Chinese authorities continue to set the daily closing value and the renminbi has appreciated less than 7% against the U.S. dollar since then. Reputable estimates of the size of the undervaluation are as high as 70% (here), but my read of the 'main-stream' estimate has been about 20-30%.

 

This intervention has caused considerable furor in the United States. It seems like every six months (or is it a year?) there is a bout of political grandstanding surrounding whether the Treasury will be forced by the Senate to include China on their list of currency manipulators, which would pave the way for the U.S. government to impose trade sanctions. Of course, due to the symbiotic nature of the trade relationship between China and the United States, this never ends up happening, but the posturing appears to have started again (here).

The market however, sees things quite differently. The renminbi forwards market is currently pricing a depreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar over the coming months.

In other words...

The best explanation I can come up with is that the market consensus is waking up to the Jim Chanos version of the Chinese growth story - economic expansion fueled by unsustainable credit growth which is financing enormous investment in overcapacity (here, starting at the 7 minute mark). While the renminbi forwards have moved in a manner consistent with the recent sell-off in Chinese equities and commodities, I was still quite surprised to see this pricing in the forward markets. Any divergence between these asset classes should be closely monitored moving forward.